Introduction
In the year 2000, 701 (or 14.0%) of large public nonfinancial US firms had zero outstanding debt, including both short-and long-term debt, in their capital structure. This is neither an outlier nor an aberration. Between 1962 and 2009, on average 10.2% of firms show no debt in their capital structure, and 32% have zero or negative net debt. This is also not a short-term fad, for 61% of firms that have no debt in their capital structure in any given year show no inclination to take on any debt in the next year. We call the tendency of so many firms to eschew any debt the zeroleverage puzzle. In this paper we explore the puzzle along various dimensions and test a number of economic mechanisms that can shed light on such an extreme corporate financial policy.
For a number of reasons, studying the zero-leverage (ZL) phenomenon is important for better understanding of capital structure decisions. It is closely related to the much studied low-leverage puzzle, which refers to the stylized fact that on average firms have low leverage ratios relative to what would be expected from various models of capital structure. The way theoretical work has typically addressed the low-leverage puzzle is by considering plausible economic forces that would drive the optimal average leverage ratio down (e.g., Goldstein, Ju, and Leland, 2001 ). However, this reconciles empirical facts with theory only insofar as average leverage ratios are equated. What we show is that to explain the low-leverage puzzle one needs to explain why some firms tend not to have debt at all instead of why firms on average have lower outstanding debt than expected, and most of extant models fail on this dimension. For example, excluding firms with lower than 5% of book (market) leverage (optimal leverage under a reasonable set of parameters is higher than 5% in most theoretical models) increases the average book (market) leverage ratio from 25% to 32% (28% to 37%). Thus, this result partially replaces the lowleverage puzzle with a zero-leverage puzzle.
From the empirical perspective, studying the determinants of zero-leverage behavior can shed light on the economic mechanisms that lead firms to become lowlevered as such factors are likely to be dominating for zero-debt firms and are thus easier to identify. In addition, it is important to investigate whether zero-leverage firms leave a substantial fraction of their value on the table by not optimizing on tax benefits of debt, extending the line of research originated by Graham (2000) .
In addition to showing the extent of the zero-leverage behavior, the paper presents evidence on another surprising (given our theories of capital structure and dividend policies) stylized fact that about a third of zero-leverage firms pay dividends. Moreover, and more intriguing, we find that, conditional on paying dividends, firms effectively replace interest expense with dividends and share repurchases, so that the total payout ratio is relatively flat across the whole spectrum of leverage.
To understand better the nature of zero-leverage behavior, we construct for each zero-leverage firm-year observation a reference set of proxy firms that serve as control observations. Each set has up to four firmobservations in the same year and industry that are closest in size and have the same dividend-paying (DP) status as the zero-leverage observation. Importantly, in constructing reference sets, we do not condition on debt policy. Our findings strongly indicate that substantial differences exist in fundamental characteristics between zero-leverage firms and their proxies. Proxy firms are highly levered (on average 20%), indicating that neither industry nor size can account for zero-debt policies.
Firms that follow zero-leverage policy have higher market-to-book ratios and higher cash balances, are more profitable, and pay more taxes and dividends. Perhaps surprisingly, zero-leverage firms are not younger than their control firms. Our analysis also indicates that debt substitutes such as leasing and pension liabilities cannot account for zero-leverage behavior. Taken together, these stylized facts provide a striking illustration of the assertion by Graham (2000) that many profitable firms seem to be underlevered.
Dividend-paying zero-leverage firms leave considerable amount of money on the table by not levering up.
Were an average such firm to increase its leverage to the level of its dividend-paying proxies, potential tax benefits amount, under the conservative scenario, to more than 7% of the market value of equity. Were the same firm to refinance to the point where its marginal corporate tax rate is zero, gains would be much larger at about 15% of the equity value.
Zero-leverage behavior is a highly persistent phenomenon. For example, conditioning on survival for five years, 30% of zero-leverage firms do not raise any debt in the next four years. In the absence of persistence, simulations show that this fraction is only 0.3%. If the firm survives for 10 years, it does not have any debt over the 10-year period in 15% of cases.
A plausible explanation of the zero-leverage phenomenon is that the manager's personal preferences differ from those of shareholders. For example, if the manager is endowed with substantial stock ownership and is thus underdiversified, he would find debt more costly than shareholders. Furthermore, if the board is more managerfriendly, a manager finds it easier to implement a strategy of his personal choice. In our empirical analysis, we find strong evidence consistent with these mechanisms. For example, for the sample of 1,006 firm-year observations with Chief Executive Officer (CEO) ownership above 10%, 22% of observations have no debt, double the fraction for the total sample. Controlling for other factors, a 1 standard deviation increase in CEO ownership increases the likelihood that a firm adopts (almost) zero-leverage policy by an economically significant 3.3%. We also find that firms with longer-tenured CEOs and smaller and more independent boards are more likely to use debt conservatively. Moreover, CEO ownership and tenure are significantly related to zero-leverage policy only in firms with smaller and less independent boards. Interestingly, these findings are much stronger in the dividend-paying sample than in the zero-dividend (ZD) sample, indicating that economic forces related to managerial preferences have a potential to explain the most puzzling part of zeroleverage behavior.
Family-controlled firms can also be expected to follow conservative debt policies. Becker (1981) and Bertrand and Schoar (2006) argue that family members can be altruistic and derive utility from passing on the family legacy and safeguarding the well being of other family members. The desire for long-term survival increases the perceived risk of default-risky debt. Consistent with this intuition, we find that family firms are substantially more likely to be zero-levered.
Our paper belongs to the cohort of empirical studies that have recently investigated conservatism in corporate debt policy. Graham (2000) finds that firms are substantially underlevered from the viewpoint of debt tax benefits. Moreover, firms that follow conservative debt policy are more likely to be stable and profitable. Minton and Wruck (2011) analyze the behavior of low-leverage firms. Similar to our study, they form reference sets for low-leverage firms in their sample and analyze the persistence and implications of financial conservatism. Our empirical method and set of questions differ from theirs in a number of ways. Their low-leverage sample includes firms that had long-term leverage in the bottom 20% of all firms for five prespecified years, and the reference set includes all remaining firms. Thus, their proxy construction is conditioned on leverage, while our proxy construction specifically excludes capital structure. Recently, Dang (2011) also shows that extreme debt conservatism is a common empirical phenomenon in the UK. Our results also add to the existing body of literature exploring the relation between managerial features and corporate capital structure policies. One stream of literature (Agrawal and Nagarajan, 1990; Berger, Ofek, and Yermack, 1997; Lewellen, 2006; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2006) has examined the influence of managerial ownership and compensation on leverage choices. Graham and Narasimhan (2004) and Malmendier, Tate, and Yan (2011) show that CEO characteristics such as overconfidence and Great Depression experience cause managers to reduce leverage. Our findings complement this literature by linking the puzzling extreme debt conservatism with several salient CEO and firm characteristics, such as CEO ownership and family status.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The following section presents the data, the methodology we use to estimate capital structure and construct proxies for zero-leverage firms, and our initial empirical analysis. Section 3 provides further empirical analysis on potential tax benefits, relation between zero-debt policy and industry and size, and the persistence of zero-debt behavior. Section 4 presents our analysis of the relation between zero-leverage policy and managerial and governance variables. Section 5 concludes.
Data description and initial empirical evidence
In this section we describe our data and present preliminary empirical evidence.
Data sources, sample selection, and leverage definitions
To construct our sample, we start with the merged annual Compustat and Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) data set over the period We define the book leverage ratio of firm i in year t by
where DLTT is the amount of long-term debt exceeding maturity of one year and DLC is debt in current liabilities, including long-term debt due within one year. The book leverage ratio is defined similarly in most recent capital structure papers (e.g., Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender, 2008; Graham and Leary, 2011; Leary and Roberts, 2010; Lemmon and Zender, 2010) .
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By the same token, we define the (quasi-)market leverage ratio of firm i in year t by
where PRCC_F is the fiscal year-end common share price and CSHO is the fiscal year-end number of shares outstanding. Because leverage measures are central to our study, we exclude all observations with missing data components (such as missing DLTT or DLC).
The choice of leverage definitions requires a special discussion in the context of our paper. As we are interested in interpreting empirical results, we would like to use the measures most often used in the empirical literature. From this perspective, Eqs. (1) and (2) are the most common definitions of total leverage. At the same time, no widespread consensus exists on what constitutes debt, and one alternative is to use total liabilities (e.g., Rajan and Zingales, 1995) . However, we are interested in active capital structure choices of firms, and a nontrivial portion of nondebt liabilities (such as accounts payable) can reflect day-to-day business arrangements instead of financing considerations. The unreported analysis of other liabilities such as accounts payable confirms that these liabilities are typically substantially smaller for zeroleverage firms.
The choice of denominator is less important in the context of zero leverage. Also, because all US firms follow 1 Another possibility is to exclude all firms with less than $10 million nominal value of book assets, which results in the omission of more observations. As the exclusion of small firms is due to the presence of noise in the accounting data, the rationale for either of the two procedures depends on the nature of noise, which can be either fixed (footnote continued) across years or proportional to average input numbers. We have replicated all the empirical analysis in the paper on the resulting second data set without any of the qualitative results being affected.
2 An alternative definition used in earlier papers is
where LT is the book value of total liabilities, TXDITC is deferred taxes, and PSTKL is preferred stock (see, e.g., Fama and French, 2002) . Defining book equity this way, using accounting variables, can lead to low or negative values of book equity causing outliers in leverage ratios. Replicating all our results using this definition of book equity while controlling for outliers does not affect our results.
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Zero and almost zero-leverage firms and their proxies
In this section we provide descriptive statistics on zero-leverage firms and their proxies.
Zero-leverage firms
We define firm i in year t as a zero-leverage firm if in that year the outstanding amounts of both short-term debt (DLC) and long-term debt (DLTT) equal zero.
3 Column 1 of Table 1 We also define the second category of firms, which we call almost zero-leverage (AZL) firms. AZL firms have a marginal debt presence in their capital structure, and we classify a firm as an AZL firm if its book leverage ratio is less than 5%. We consider these firms in addition to ZL firms for a number of reasons. From a theoretical standpoint, a number of models (e.g., Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner, 1989; Leland, 1994 Leland, , 1998 Leland and Toft, 1996; Goldstein, Ju, and Leland, 2001; Ju, Parrino, Poteshman, and Weisbach, 2005) produce leverage ratios that are well above zero. Cross-sectional dynamics modeled by Strebulaev (2007) can produce firms that are almost zeroleverage but in his benchmark case their fraction is very low. Practically, the finance nature of various liabilities assigned by accounting conventions to debt is ambiguous (for example, advances to finance construction or installment obligations). While our choice of the 5% cutoff is ad hoc, it is likely on the conservative side. Increasing the cutoff to 7% (10%) increases the average annual fraction of AZL firms by 3.1 (7.7) percentage points. As Columns 3 of Table 1 shows, an astonishing 22% of firms are almost zero-levered for the whole sample and almost 28% can be classified as AZL over the 1987-2009 period. Untabulated results for AZL firms defined by market leverage are qualitatively similar. To reflect on the models mentioned above, none of them, whether dynamic or static, can produce such low leverage for reasonable parameters (for example, in Strebulaev, 2007 , less than 1% of firms have leverage of less than 5% in dynamics). Finally, as cash could be viewed as negative debt in some contexts, we also investigate the fraction of firms that have nonpositive net debt (NPND), in which net debt is defined as the book value of debt minus cash (CHE). 4 We find that 33% (39%) of firms had nonpositive net debt over the 1962-2009 (1987-2009) period. Again, the means hide a substantial variation across years. A comparison of ZL and NPND firms suggests that for a substantial number of firms cash plays a more important role in their balance sheets than debt liabilities.
Proxies
The consistently large fractions of ZL and AZL firms are surprising and the next question to ask is whether comparable firms have different leverage ratios. To gauge this, we proceed by constructing for every ZL and AZL firm-year observation a reference set of proxy firm-years. Our benchmark construction procedure is by calendar year, industry, size, and dividend-paying status. It is important to stress that we do not condition on leverage-related measures. For example, proxies can be zero-levered as well. Specifically, we start by identifying for each ZL and AZL firm-year all firms in that year with the same three-digit SIC code. As most industries include firms in different stages of their life, such as high-growth (by industry standards) and mature, we condition by choosing only those proxies that follow the same dividend policy: for zero-dividend (dividend-paying) ZL and AZL firms, proxies are chosen among zero-dividend (dividend-paying) firms. This conditioning has been used in other studies. For example, Fama and French (2002) justify the separation of ZD and DP firms by arguing that it tests better the implications of the pecking order idea (Myers, 1984) , and Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008) control for dividend payers in their empirical analysis of leverage ratios.
Of all the firms in the same three-digit SIC industry in the year of the observation and the same dividend-paying status, we choose up to four firms closest to the ZL and AZL observation in size, as measured by the natural logarithm of the book value of assets, as long as the value of book assets is between 0.5 and 2 times the corresponding value of the ZL and AZL observation. We call this a reference set of proxy firms. On average, for each ZL and AZL observation, this set contains 3.4 proxies. The set of proxy firms varies cross-sectionally for ZL and AZL firms within the same industry because of differences in size, and it varies temporally for the same ZL and AZL firm because of the evolution in the industry composition. Acharya, Almeida, and Campello (2007) , Gamba and Triantis (2008) , and Acharya, Davydenko, and Strebulaev (forthcoming). 5 To ensure the robustness of the matching procedure, we also construct a matched sample using a propensity score methodology similar to that of Lemmon and Roberts (2010) . In particular, we use size, dividend-paying status, industry (three-digit SIC classification) dummies, and year dummies to predict AZL status in a logit regression and obtain propensity scores (the predicted probability of a firm being AZL). Overall, the results are consistent across the two samples. Further details are available upon request.
6 Book leverage is slightly lower than market leverage because of the way we define book leverage. See footnote 2. 7 One well-known explanation of higher cash balances is that large global companies are tax-disadvantaged when repatriating profits into the US and, thus, keep cash in their foreign subsidiaries (Foley, Hartzell, Titman, and Twite, 2007) . See also Graham and Tucker (2006) for the analysis of tax shelters in general. If we exclude the largest zero-leverage firms, however, the result is virtually unchanged.
Table 2
Descriptive statistics for zero-leverage (ZL) and almost zero-leverage (AZL) firms. This table reports the descriptive statistics for ZL and AZL firms and their proxy firms. ZL firms are firms that have zero book debt in a given year. AZL firms are firms with book leverage not exceeding 5% in a given year. The selection procedure of proxy firms is described in Section 2.2.2. All variables are defined in Appendix A. Panel A reports statistics for all ZL and AZL firms and their proxy firms. Panel B reports the same statistics for dividend-paying (DP) ZL and AZL firms; Panel C, for zero-dividend (ZD) ZL and AZL firms. The statistics of ZL and AZL firms are obtained by taking first means for firms in each year and then averaging over all years. To compute proxy statistics, proxy firms for each ZL and AZL observation are first equally weighted, then means are taken for each year, assigning equal weight to each set of proxy firms, and then means are averaged over all years. The t-statistic is obtained by applying the Fama and MacBeth procedure to the timeseries of annual averages. The absolute value of a positive (negative) sig is the number of years in which there is a significant positive (negative) difference (at 5% level) between ZL and AZL firms and proxy firms. The ''All'' column gives the means for the total sample [DP (ZD) firms in Panel B (C) firms have a credit rating, compared with 2.7% of proxies. However, conditional on having a credit rating, ZL firms are substantially more likely to have an investment grade rating than proxy firms. The effect is particularly pronounced for dividend payers, in which, conditional on having a credit rating, 92% of ZL firms have an investmentgrade credit rating. At the same time, ZL and AZL firms and their proxies are similar along other dimensions, such as age (defined as the number of years in Compustat), Research and development (R&D) expenditure, and earnings volatility. In particular, ZL and AZL firms are not statistically different from their proxies in terms of net equity issuance, suggesting that these firms do not use external equity financing to substitute debt financing. Instead, ZL firms seem to use overall less external financing.
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The table also reports the kink measure, introduced by John Graham (Graham, 2000; van Binsbergen, Graham, and Yang, 2010) , for ZL and proxy firms. Kink is defined as the ratio of the amount of interest required to make the firm marginal tax rate slope downward to the actual interest expense of the firm.
9 ZL and AZL firms have much larger kinks than their proxy firms, indicating that ZL and AZL firms potentially have considerable room to increase their leverage and take advantage of the tax benefits of debt.
Dividend-paying and zero-dividend samples
While this descriptive analysis is suggestive, it overlooks the possibility that the differences are driven by ZL firms that are high-growth firms. That very high-growth firms could prefer having substantially less debt is not very surprising. At the same time, for the total sample, ZL and AZL firms pay higher dividends and have higher cash balances. As a standard approach to distinguish between high-growth firms and cash cows, we study dividendpaying and zero-dividend samples separately. From an economic viewpoint, it would be more surprising to observe ZL firms that also pay dividends, thus effectively replacing payout to debtholders with payout to equityholders. 10 Table 3 summarizes our final classification of the sample, with the abbreviated names for the four classes of firms. For example, firms that pay a dividend and have the book leverage ratio of less than 5% are called AZL-DP firms. It might be of more economic importance to show and explain the puzzling prevalence of ZL-DP and AZL-DP firms, the issue on which we mostly concentrate in this paper.
Panels B and C of Table 2 report descriptive statistics for DP and ZD firms and their proxies, respectively. An important result is that conditioning on dividend-paying policy does not resolve the zero-leverage puzzle. Firms in each of four classes have substantially lower leverage than their proxies. The characteristics of ZL-ZD and AZL-ZD firms support the contention that these firms are high-growth. Their size is smaller than that of DP firms, they are younger, their R&D expense is higher, and, importantly, they are on average substantially less profitable than DP firms.
11 Perhaps surprisingly, ZD and DP zero-leverage firms are similar along a number of other dimensions in that ZD firms also have higher cash balances and pay higher income taxes than their proxies. ZL-DP (AZL-DP) firms have substantially higher dividend ratios than their proxies. They pay out on average 57% (41%) more than their proxies as measured relative to book assets. What is then the total payout of these firms? Fig. 1 shows the decomposition of the ratio of total payout to book assets as a function of leverage for the total sample period. It shows that, as expected, interest expense is a monotonically increasing function of leverage. It also shows that dividends and share repurchases are almost monotonically decreasing in leverage. A surprising observation is that the total payout ratio is relatively stable across the leverage spectrum, between about 5.1% and 6.1%. If anything, the payout ratio of zeroleverage firms is almost the largest of all firms at 6.0%. This supports the intuition that ZL-DP and AZL-DP firms do not choose to eschew debt because they think they have to retain a higher fraction of earnings, which is something one would expect from high-growth firms in the presence of financial constraints. 12 The upshot of this figure is that to explain the zero-leverage puzzle we need to identify economic mechanisms that make firms willing to replace payments to debtholders with payments to shareholders. In an unreported analysis, we follow Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001) and study a logit model to predict firms' financial choices. We find that ZL and AZL firms are much less likely to issue equity compared with their proxies and overall prefer internal over external financing. Results are available upon request. 9 We thank John Graham for generously sharing the data with us.
The maximum of kink is set to 10 in van Binsbergen, Graham, and Yang (2010) . Although ZL firms have zero debt level at the end of the fiscal year, they still could have made interest payments in that year and, thus, the kink variable can be less than the allowed maximum. 10 We also explore several alternative classification schemes, for example, based on the expected tax benefits and on the total payout policy (the sum of interest and dividend payments) with qualitatively similar conclusions.
11 Although many of these firms report negative Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) profits, some still pay income taxes. We also do not take into account tax credits and the nonlinearities in income tax schedules. 12 Unreported, when we produce the same figure for zero-dividend firms, the result is strikingly different: ZD firms have a payout that is monotonically increasing with leverage. These firms could need to save retained earnings for expansion and their access to credit could be more limited. Also unreported, the results of both of these figures, for DP and ZD firms, are consistent across years. 
Regression analysis
To explore further the properties of zero-leverage firms, Table 4 reports the results of multivariate logit regressions, in which the dependent variable takes the value of one if a firm-year observation is AZL, i.e., has a book leverage of 5% or less, for the total sample as well as for the DP and ZD subsamples. Unreported, when we conduct the analysis only for the sample of AZL firms and their proxies, or using the ZL dummy variable as the dependent variable, the results are very similar. Firms that follow zero-leverage policy are smaller, have higher market-to-book ratio, are more profitable, have less tangible assets, and pay higher dividends. Zero-leverage policy is also persistent. Firms that have zero leverage when they are reported in Compustat for the first time are more likely to have zero leverage in subsequent years. Firms are also more likely to have zero leverage when the fraction of ZL firms is high in their three-digit SIC industry. The table also shows the economic significance of these measures by providing the change in probability that the firm follows a ZL policy for 1 standard deviation change in the independent variable (or for the change from zero to one for a dummy variable). A 1 standard deviation increase in profitability is associated with an increase in propensity to become an AZL firm by between 1.9% and 3.5% and the same change in tangibility with a decrease in propensity by between 4.6% and 7.1%. Controlling for other variables, firms that have higher asset sales and capital expenditures are more likely to be AZL. This suggests that AZL firms could sell assets to finance capital expenditure or retire debt, or both, and is consistent with our (unreported) finding that AZL firms use less external financing than comparable firms (see also footnote 8).
A straightforward explanation of low leverage is that debt is squeezed out by various substitutes or nondebt tax shields (DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980; Graham, Lang, and Shackleford, 2004; Graham and Tucker, 2006; Shivdasani and Stefanescu, 2010) . Data availability allows us to check two such economic mechanisms. First, although capital leases are included on the balance sheet as debt, operating leases are not. Recently, the topic of operating leases has received renewed attention in the capital structure literature. Rampini and Viswanathan (2010) and Rauh and Sufi (2012) propose including the capitalized value of operating leases in total debt valuation. However, operating leases can both complement traditional debt and play the role of its substitute (see, e.g., Ang and Peterson, 1984; Lewis and Schallheim, 1992; Graham, Lemmon, and Schallheim, 1998; Yan, 2006; Eisfeldt and Rampini, 2009) . Following Graham, Lemmon, and Schallheim (1998) , we define operating leases as the sum of current rental payment (XRENT) and the discounted present value of future rental commitments ðMRC1,MRC2, . . . ,MRC5Þ. The discount rate is set to be 10% for all firms as in Graham, Lemmon, and Schallheim (1998) . 13 Results of univariate comparison in Table 2 and logit regressions Table 4 show that ZL and AZL firms' use of operating leases are not significantly different from other firms, for all the samples we consider. This finding suggests that operating leases are unlikely to play a major role in explaining zero-leverage policy. Second, unfunded pension and health care liabilities constitute potentially an important debt substitute. These liabilities have recently played an important part in many high-profile bankruptcies, such as GM and United Airlines. Shivdasani and Stefanescu (2010) find that for firms with defined benefit pension plans, tax deductions of pension contributions equal about one-third of that of debt interest payments. Following Shivdasani and Stefanascu, we define pension obligations as the sum of Projected Pension Obligations (PBPRO) and Projected Pension Obligations (Underfunded) (PBPRU), and pension assets as the sum of Pension Plan Assets (PPLAO) and Pension Plan Assets (Underfunded) (PPLAU). We define Net Pension Liabilities as the difference between pension obligations and pension assets if pension obligations are greater than or equal to pension assets, and as zero otherwise. We use Net Pension Liabilities as a proxy for the extent of tax deductibility of pension plans.
14 In our sample, only about one-tenth (16,966) of the firm-year observations report positive Net Pension Liabilities. Interestingly, Tables 2 and 4 show that zero-leverage firms have significantly less (net) pension liabilities than other firms. This result is consistent with a stylized observation that firms with large unfunded pension plans are also typically highly levered. Overall, economic factors that lead to higher debt usage also likely contribute to larger pension liabilities and are unlikely to explain zero-leverage policy. Firms can also follow zero-leverage policy in an attempt to retain financial flexibility in anticipation of future investment. To study the impact of future investment, we follow Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004) Total payout is defined as the sum of dividend payout (including preferred dividend), share repurchases, and interest payment. 13 We also tried an alternative definition of operating leases using available short-term borrowing rate (BASTR). Adopting this alternative definition reduces the size of the sample by more than two-thirds, but does not change any results materially. 14 Using pension contributions as an alternative proxy does not generate any differences between ZL/AZL firms and proxy firms. . The dependent variable is the dummy that equals one if a firm-year is AZL, i.e., when it has book leverage less than 5%. Columns 1-2 present results for the entire sample. Columns 3-4 present results for the subsample of dividend-paying (DP) firms. Columns 5-6 present results for the subsample of zero-dividend (ZD) firms. Ind. Frac. AZL is the fraction of AZL firms (excluding the firm in question) in the same industry, defined by three-digit standard industrial classification, and the same year. All other variables are defined in Appendix A. All independent variables are lagged one year, except for the Abnormal Cap. Ex. variable, which is contemporaneous to capture anticipated investment. Coefficients, t-statistics (in parentheses), and economic significance are reported. Economic significance is the average change in probability for a one standard deviation change for a continuous independent variable or for the change from zero to one for a dummy variable. Year fixed effects for calendar years are included. All standard errors adjust for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the firm level. Coefficients marked with nnn , nn , and n are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
All firms DP firms ZD firms 
where CE t is capital expenditure scaled by book assets. To capture the anticipation of future abnormal investment, we use contemporaneous values of the abnormal investment variables (we use lagged values of other independent variables). Table 4 shows that firms with lower abnormal investment levels in the future are more likely to become zero-levered. Panels B and C show that this relation is exhibited by both dividend payers and nonpayers. For robustness, we consider a variety of alternative definitions of abnormal investment. Specifically, we also define abnormal investment as CE t ÀðCE tÀ1 þ CE tÀ2 þ CE tÀ3 Þ=3 and use sales instead of book assets as the denominator of capital expenditure. Alternatively, we define unexpected investment as the residual from regressions of current capital expenditure on three (or five) lagged values at the individual firm or at the industry level. The results are similar across all these specifications. Our results suggest that future financial flexibility is potentially an important factor in zero and low-leverage policy decisions. The results of our regression analysis need to be taken with a large grain of salt as leverage decisions are endogenous to other financial and investment decisions. Nevertheless, the reported correlations are suggestive. Firms (and, more so, dividend-paying firms) that prefer to eschew debt are profitable, exhibit large tax payments, accumulate large cash balances, and pay out larger dividends; in fact, they replace interest payments with dividends and stock repurchases. If anything, these firms violate the standard trade-off proposition and take to the extreme the Graham (2000) assertion that firms that are ''large, profitable, liquid, in stable industries, and face low ex ante costs of distress'' (p. 1902) are underlevered. Table 5 Entry and exit decisions of almost zero-leverage (AZL) policy.
This table reports the results of the logit analysis of entry and exit decisions of the AZL policy. An entry (exit) decision is defined as a firm being non-AZL (AZL) in the last year and AZL (non-AZL) in the current year and the change in book debt is at least 5% of lagged book assets. Columns 1-2 present results for the entry decisions; Columns 3-4, for the exit decisions. Ind. Frac. AZL is the fraction of AZL firms (excluding the firm in question) in the same industry, defined by three-digit standard industrial classification, and the same year. All other variables are defined in Appendix A. All independent variables are lagged one year, except for the Abnormal Cap. Ex. variable, which is contemporaneous to capture anticipated investment. Table 5 reports the logit analysis of AZL policy initiations and exits. An entry (exit) event is defined as a firm following a non-AZL (AZL) policy in the last year and an AZL (non-AZL) policy in the current year. In addition, to study nontrivial changes in leverage, we exclude all observations, in which the change in book debt amounts is less than 5% of lagged book assets.
The table shows that smaller, less tangible firms are more likely, and dividend payers are less likely, to become zero-levered. However, conditional on paying dividends, paying out more in dividends increases the propensity to become zero-levered. Firms that have the AZL status when they are recorded in Compustat for the first time and have a larger number of peers that follow the AZL policy are substantially more likely to initiate the AZL policy. For exit decisions, almost all of the variables have the opposite sign compared with the entry decision (with the notable exception of firm size, which has no impact on exit). Thus, AZL firms are less likely to lever up when they have lower tangibility, pay out larger dividends, or have more peers that also follow the AZL policy. In addition, more profitable AZL firms are less likely to lever up. Future abnormal capital expenditures are negatively related to entries and positively related to exits, consistent with the intuition that future financial flexibility can be an important concern for adopting the AZL policy. Overall, the results of Table 5 confirm the panel results discussed in Section 2.2.4.
Understanding zero-leverage behavior
In this section we provide further empirical analysis of the zero-leverage phenomenon.
The value of potential tax benefits for zero-leverage firms
How much in tax benefits can ZL and AZL firms potentially get if they increase their leverage? In other words, how much money do they leave on the table by not levering up? This is a similar question to the one investigated by Graham (2000) for a cross-section of US firms. If the marginal tax rates for ZL firms are close to zero, then the potential tax benefits of borrowing are limited and the ZL phenomenon might not be puzzling after all. Some preliminary evidence, such as that on the extent of profitability of dividend-paying ZL and AZL firms, suggests that the marginal tax rates of ZL firms are in fact likely to be higher than those of comparable firms. Also, ZL firms are more likely to have an investment-;grade rating, conditional on having a credit rating at all. Most important, ZL and AZL firms have much larger kinks than their proxy firms. However, this evidence does not show the economic magnitude of the unutilized tax savings. In this section, we quantify the value of these tax shields to explore the issue in more detail.
Consider a scenario, in which a firm intends to raise its (market) leverage from its current ratio L 0 to a new leverage ratio L n by undergoing recapitalization. For tractability, we assume that debt takes the form of perpetuity and is issued at par and that all parameters are constant. As long as finite maturity debt issues are expected to be routinely rolled over, this assumption is innocuous. Let firm's outstanding book debt be D 0 and the current value of its market equity be ME 0 . After restructuring, book debt and market equity values are, respectively, D n ¼ D 0 þ DD and ME n . The potential tax benefits, denoted by PTBðDDÞ, are given by
where tðxÞ is the marginal tax rate of the firm with debt level x. We assume that tax benefits accrue to equityholders and that any debt raised is used to pay dividends or repurchase shares. The new market equity value is given by
and the new leverage ratio L n is
To compute the potential tax benefits for each firm, we need marginal tax rates at all leverage levels. For the marginal tax rate tðD 0 Þ at the firm's current leverage, we use both the after-interest and before-interest marginal tax rates (Graham, Lemmon, and Schallheim, 1998; Graham, 2000) . 16 We then assume that tðxÞ is linearly 
We estimate D m for each firm-year as
where CF m i,t reflects the projected cash flow capability and r t is the applicable interest rate. In essence, we assume that the firm can utilize tax benefits only to the extent it is 15 We thank the anonymous referee for suggesting this line of analysis. 16 Although after-interest marginal tax rates are commonly used to compute tax benefits of debt, Graham, Lemmon, and Schallheim (1998) propose using before-interest marginal tax rates under certain circumstances to avoid the endogenous influence of capital structure on marginal tax rates. We thank John Graham for making the data available to us. Because Graham' profitable and we ignore the complications of tax carry provisions. As a conservative benchmark case, we assume that the marginal tax rate is zero at the minimum cash flow level that the firm had over the last N years:
where earnings are rescaled by the firm's book assets in year t. This definition of D m ensures that in each period the interest payment rD n for debt level D n oD m is smaller than any of the cash flows in the past N years, so that this firm, if it refinances to D n , is unlikely to face a liquidity crisis in the future. Specifically, if in any year cash flow is negative, the marginal tax rate is assumed zero. As a proxy for r t we use the average corporate bond interest rate in year t. In the benchmark case, we choose N ¼ 5 and r t ¼ r AA t , the AA-rated corporate bond yield, which we obtain from Moody's AA corporate bond yield time series from Global Financial Data.
Alternatively, we define CF m i,t to be the average (rescaled) cash flow level in the past N years:
This formulation is less conservative in a sense that even in the case of tax losses, it assumes that the firm is able to utilize them later. We also consider the alternative choice for interest rate r t ¼ r BBB t , the BBB-rated corporate bond yield. With Eqs. (7) and (4), the potential tax benefit function is
Plugging Eq. (11) into Eq. (6), the new leverage ratio is
The solution of DD in terms of the new leverage, DD ¼ DDðL n Þ, is provided in Appendix B.
18 Table 6 shows the potential tax benefits of ZL and AZL firms as a fraction of market asset values (in which the market value of equity is measured before relevering) for various new leverage ratios and alternative assumptions. We first investigate the scenario of the new leverage L n being the average market leverage ratio of the reference set, which we denote by L Pr . To control for implicit distress costs, we impose an additional upper bound of 70% (see, e.g., Asquith, Gertner, and Scharfstein, 1994 Our assumptions in deriving potential tax benefits are mostly on the conservative side: Tax savings from carryforward and carry-back provisions are largely excluded; by using the minimum cash flow in the past five years as the liquidity threshold in the benchmark case, the chances that the firm goes into liquidity crisis and incurs significant costs of distress are much lower; and the assumption that the marginal tax rate function is linear decreases tax benefits relative to the case, in which it is concave (which is more likely to be the case in practice). Therefore, the fact that ZL-DP firms give up substantial amount of tax benefits reinforces the mystery about their extreme debt aversion. One reason for a potential overestimation of tax benefits is our lack of adjustment for personal taxes. As the level of marginal personal taxes on income and capital gains depends on the ownership structure of firms, and firm-specific marginal personal tax rates are not available, we leave it for further exploration.
Relation between zero-leverage and low-leverage puzzles
The low-leverage puzzle refers to the stylized fact that, on average, firms are lower levered than otherwise would be expected by standard trade-off models of capital structure. For example, over the period 1987-2003, the market leverage ratio of an average firm in the Compustat sample is about 26%. A benchmark static capital structure model of Leland (1994) produces a leverage ratio in the order of 70-90% under reasonable parameters. A number of studies have been trying to identify theoretically the reasons that firms are on average low levered. For example, Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001) , Ju, Parrino, Poteshman, and Weisbach (2005) and Strebulaev (2007) explain the low-leverage puzzle by considering dynamic capital structure and non-linear tax benefits to debt. In addition, Strebulaev (2007) shows that in dynamic capital structure models typically lead to higher leverage in dynamics compared with refinancing points. Ju, Parrino, Poteshman, and Weisbach (2005) and Morellec (2004) consider managerial risk-aversion and managerial entrenchment. All these studies find that their calibrated models can produce, under reasonable parameters, lower leverage ratios, thus explaining the average corporate leverage ratio in the economy. For example, by considering the dynamic version of their static model, Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001) reduce the benchmark leverage ratio in their calibrations from 55% to a more reasonable 36% at refinancing.
Characteristically, however, all these models produce a relatively high lowest leverage ratio under the most cases they consider. The lowest leverage is 34.3% in Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001, (Hennessy and Whited, 2005; Hackbarth and Mauer, 2012) and models that introduce fixed costs in the dynamic capital structure model with sufficiently small firms optimally choosing zero leverage (Kurshev and Strebulaev, 2012) . For example, Hackbarth and Mauer (2012) find optimal leverage ratios as low as 12% as a result of debt overhang and debt dilution in dynamics.
These models are a long way from being able to explain the presence of ZL and AZL firms in the economy. Broadly, our results demonstrate that these models are unlikely to explain the cross-sectional distribution of corporate leverage ratios. This is consistent with the observation of Graham (2003) that many low-debt firms are not firms that one would think of having high costs of debt.
The low-leverage and zero-leverage puzzles are closely connected. Table 7 shows that if one excludes ZL firms from the Compustat sample, then the average (market) leverage ratio over the 1987-2009 period increases from 24.7% to 28.6%. Moreover, if one also excludes AZL firms (as most of these models cannot produce almost zero leverage as well), the average leverage ratio increases further from 28.6% to 36%, which is roughly the level of debt produced by such models as Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001) and Strebulaev (2007) . The fact that excluding ZL and AZL firms produces a moderately ''high'' leverage of about 36% suggests that the explanation of the low-leverage puzzle is likely to lie not in the behavior of the average firm, which is almost ''normally'' levered, but in the extremely low-levered firms. In other words, these results show that the low-leverage puzzle is actually an artifact of the zero-leverage puzzle and a new generation of theoretical models to explain it could be needed.
Persistence of zero-leverage behavior
Corporate leverage is a persistent phenomenon (e.g., Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender, 2008) . In this subsection we, therefore, address an important question of whether zero-leverage policy is persistent. If zero-leverage is an artifact of imbalance between maturing debt contracts and new debt issuance, this would imply that the puzzling behavior is only of short duration.
To analyze the persistence with which firms follow ZL and AZL policies, for each firm j in our sample and for each k between 1 and 20, we estimate the probability that firm j follows the ZL (AZL) policy continuously for kÀ1 more years, conditional on adopting such a policy in any given year and surviving for at least kÀ1 years. 20 To give an example, assume the firm has 25 consecutive annual observations in Compustat and has zero leverage in the first 15 years and is highly levered in the remaining 10 years. There are 15 sequences of k ¼10 consecutive years for this firm beginning with a year in which the firm has zero debt. The firm follows the zero-debt policy for at least 10 years for six out of these 15 sequences. Thus, conditional on adopting a ZL policy, the firm continues to follow it for a further nine years with likelihood of 0.4. By averaging over all firms we get a measure of the k-year conditional persistence of a chosen debt policy in the sample. Averaging over firms avoids bias in favor of more mature firms. Table 8 reports the results of this exercise. Firms have a 61% chance of continuing a ZL policy in the next year. About 30%, 15%, and 5% (35%, 20%, and 9%) of firms that survived for five, ten, and 20 years, respectively, continuously exhibit ZL (AZL) behavior. Although these numbers are suggestive, to compare them with similar statistics in the absence of intertemporal dependence, we construct the same persistence measure for random samples. To this end, for each year we randomly reshuffle leverage ratios across firms in the Compustat data set. In other words, for each firm in the Compustat sample, a corresponding firm in the random sample is assumed to exist for exactly the same number of years. However, in each year this corresponding firm in the random sample has the book leverage ratio of a random Compustat firm in that year, instead of that of the actual Compustat firm. The resulting random sample is, thus, identical to the empirical sample in terms of the number of firms each year as well as the distribution of cross-sectional leverage ratios each year. We then repeat this process to construct 500 random samples. Finally, we estimate the persistence measure for each random sample and report averages in the table. Constructed in this way, the random samples can be thought of as a benchmark economy with no persistence in debt policies, which at the same time produces cross-sectional descriptive statistics of leverage ratios identical to the economy observed in each year.
Panel A of Table 8 reports that in the random economy a ZL firm stays ZL in the next year with a 9.3% chance, compared with the empirically observed 61%. For longer periods the random economy generates persistence values close to zero. As confirmed by t-statistics, a statistically significant difference exists in persistence between the actual and random economies. Such differences effectively rule out the possibility that zero-leverage is not a persistent phenomenon. This result is consistent with findings that firms restructure their leverage infrequently (Leary and Roberts, 2005; Strebulaev, 2007) .
DeAngelo and Roll (2012) find evidence that, although capital structure stability is an infrequent phenomenon, the stable leverage regimes are mostly concentrated in the low leverage spectrum. To relate our results to theirs, we replicate the procedure used in DeAngelo and Roll (2012, Table 10) on our sample. 21 Following their analysis, an X% stability regime is defined as the longest period in which the firm's book leverage continuously remains in a range of values that differ by no more than X%. Panel B of Table 8 shows that, for firms with stable leverage regimes for 10 years and longer, most of the 5% and 10% stable leverage firms are, in fact, zero-or almost zero-leverage firms. For example, in the 5% stability sample, 99% of firms are always AZL firms, and 94% of firms follow the AZL policy for at least one year. Even in wider leverage regimes, zero-leverage policy is prominent. For example, Table 7 Low-leverage and zero-leverage puzzles. This table reports means and medians of leverage ratios for the total sample, the sample excluding zero-leverage (ZL) firms, and the sample excluding almost zero-leverage (AZL) firms. Results for the 1962-2009 and 1987-2009 periods are given in Panel A and Panel B, respectively. Columns 1 and 2 report market leverage; Columns 3 and 4, book leverage. For consistency, in Columns 1 and 2, AZL firms are defined by market leverage not exceeding 5%, and in Columns 3 and 4 they are defined by book leverage not exceeding 5%. in the 20% stability regime, 70% of firms follow the AZL policy at least once and 20% of firms are always AZL. These results show that the persistence of ZL and AZL behavior is likely responsible for most of the stable leverage behavior identified by DeAngelo and Roll (2012) . In other words, taken together, these results suggest that ZL and AZL firms are more persistent than firms in all other leverage ranges. 
Market

Industry and zero-leverage firms
Results in Table 4 strongly indicate that zero-leverage behavior is driven in part by industry-specific factors. To explore this further, Table 9 reports the distribution of ZL and AZL firms in major industries using either equal (Panel A) or value (Panel B) weights. There is indeed a substantial variation of the extent of zero-leverage is the number of k-year sequences for firm i that are all ZL observations. The persistence of AZL policy is similarly defined. Column 1 gives the number of consecutive years k in consideration. Column 2 reports the persistence measure (in percentage points) of the ZL policy for the Compustat sample. Column 3 and 4 report the mean and standard deviation of the persistence measure over five hundred randomly generated economies, respectively. Columns 5-7 report the same measures for AZL firms. Panel B reports the relation between stable leverage regimes and zero-leverage behavior. An X% stability regime is defined as the longest period in which the firm's book leverage continuously remains in a range of values that differ by no more than X%. Panel B shows the fractions of firms with stable leverage regimes ten years and longer (or 20 years and longer) that have always pursued a ZL or AZL policy or have adopted a ZL or AZL policy at least once in their history. The last column gives the number of firms that have a X% stability regime for 10 years and longer (or 20 years and longer). (Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender, 2008) influences our persistence results. We find that the persistence of ZL and AZL firms is to a large extent insensitive to unexpected leverage, except when (footnote continued) unexpected leverage is very low, consistent with dynamic rebalancing mechanism.
behavior across industries-in Panel A from 4.3% (9.4%) of firms following a ZL (AZL) policy in the telecommunications sector to 15.0% (32.0%) of firms following ZL (AZL) policy in the technology sector over the 1962-2009 period. The extent of ZL (AZL) behavior in health care and technology industries could be consistent with the view that reputation, human capital, and asset illiquidity considerations are influential. Given that ZL and AZL firms are smaller than their industry peers, it is not surprising that their fractions are lower when the value weighting is used. Nevertheless, as Panel B of the table shows, each industry still has a significant number of ZL and AZL firms, indicating that extreme debtaversion is a widespread rather than a specialized phenomenon. The results over the two sample periods (1962-2009 and 1987-2009 ) also demonstrate that the distribution of ZL firms in each industry is relatively stable over time.
Zero-leverage behavior and corporate governance
A plausible explanation of the puzzling zero-leverage behavior is in the preferences of corporate decision makers, managers, and large shareholders. Firms could end up lowlevered if managers have a personal preference to use debt conservatively. For example, CEOs with large stock ownership are likely to be less diversified than institutional investors, leading to personal costs of distress being substantially higher. Another argument that CEOs who are large shareholders could be unwilling to lever up is that their personal tax situation is different from that of a marginal shareholder. Grinblatt and Titman (2002, p. 552) give an example of Microsoft, suggesting that a potential reason of Microsoft's zero leverage is Bill Gates's personal tax situation. Furthermore, when CEOs are more entrenched and face friendlier boards, they are more likely to be successful in pursuing policies of their choice (Weisbach, 1988; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998) . In this section, we examine whether the relation between zero-leverage phenomena and CEO and governance variables is consistent with some of these economic forces.
A substantial empirical literature links managerial preferences and corporate actions. For example, Lewellen (2006) finds that the larger the stock ownership of CEOs and the smaller their option grants, the more likely their firms have lower leverage. Agrawal and Nagarajan (1990) find that firms that had no long-term debt between 1979 and 1983 have higher managerial stockholdings than their levered industry counterparts. Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006) find that managers with greater delta (sensitivity of compensation to stock prices) and smaller vega (sensitivity of compensation to stock volatility) use less debt. 23 In addition, Graham and Narasimhan (2004) show that CEOs with Great Depression experience tend to rely more on internal than external financing, and Malmendier, Tate, and Yan (2011) show that CEO overconfidence and Great Depression experience lead to more conservative leverage policy. In a theoretical model, Hackbarth (2008) studies the implications of managerial traits such as optimism and overconfidence on leverage decisions. Yang (2011) shows that the heterogenous beliefs between the manager and investors can lead to debt conservatism. Ryan and Wang (2011) find that CEOs who have worked for more employers increase firm's leverage. Our results complement these studies by providing links between the extreme debt conservatism of firms and salient CEO and firm characteristics. 
Data and variables
Adding CEO characteristics, as well as ownership and corporate governance measures, reduces our sample substantially. We first introduce the new variables and discuss the resulting sample. We use board and certain CEO characteristics from the RiskMetrics Directors database [formerly Investor Responsibility Research Center 23 However, in an earlier work, Berger, Ofek, and Yermack (1997) find that both CEO stock ownership and option holdings are positively related to leverage. 24 Zwiebel (1996) proposes an economic mechanism in which managers can optimally choose higher leverage when faced with a possibility of hostile takeovers. Using such measures as the G-index of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) , we do not find support for this argument. However, these measures are known to be endogenous and more robust empirical methods, such as structural modeling, are needed to shed further light on this issue. We leave it to future research.
(IRRC)]. The database covers the S&P 1500 firms over the period [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] . The variables we use are Board Size, the number of directors in the board; Frac. Indep. Directors, the fraction of independent (noninsider and nonaffiliated) directors in the board; and CEO Tenure, the number of years that the current CEO has served as the firm's CEO. We also use CEO ownership and compensation variables from the Compustat ExecComp database, which covers essentially the S&P 1500 firms over the period [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] . The variables we use are CEO Stock Ownership, CEO holdings of the firm's stock as a fraction of total shares outstanding; CEO Option Holdings, CEO holdings of the firm's stock options as a fraction of stock shares outstanding; and CEO Cash Comp., logarithm of the sum of CEO salary and bonus. We restrict analysis to firms in our entire sample for which the above CEO and board variables are defined. The restricted sample consists of 13,446 observations with 1,962 unique firms over the period 1996-2009.
Empirical analysis
We start by describing the relation between zeroleverage policies and CEO ownership in our sample. Table 10 ranks all sample firm-years (Panel A) and firms (Panel B) by CEO stock ownership and reports the fraction of ZL and AZL among these firms. The table clearly shows that two measures are highly correlated. For example, consider one hundred firms with the highest CEO ownership. For these firms, the average CEO ownership is 24% (versus 2.8% for the whole sample) and the fraction of these firms that pursue ZL (AZL) policy is 20.4% (40.5%) compared with just 14.1% (27.1%) for the whole sample. Overall, the table shows a nearly monotonic relation between the extent of the CEO stock ownership and the zero-leverage policies. Table 11 shows the results of the logit analysis of AZL policy. For all regressions, we control for the variables used in Table 4 (except Net Pension Liabilities and Operating Leases). All independent variables are lagged in the regressions. Unreported, the economic and statistical significance of these variables is consistent with the results in Table 4 , suggesting that the determinants of ZL policy in the restricted sample have a similar impact. Table 11 shows that firms with larger CEO stock ownership are substantially more likely to be zero-levered, consistent with managerial preference explanations. A 1 standard deviation increase in CEO stock ownership increases the likelihood of AZL policy by an economically and statistically significant 3.3 percentage points. In addition, firms in which CEOs have larger option-based compensation packages are likely to be more levered, although this relation is less robust. The results also indicate that poorer corporate governance is related to ZL policy: Firms with more independent directors, larger boards, and shorter CEO tenure are less likely to choose zero leverage. In addition, unreported results show that these results are substantially stronger for the sample of dividend-paying firms than for zero-dividend firms, suggesting that the managerial preference story is able to explain the most puzzling part of zero-leverage behavior. Existing empirical evidence on the relation between board size and firm performance is ambiguous (e.g., Yermack, 1996; Eisenberg, Sundgren, and Wells, 1998; Bhagat and Black, 2001; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2008) . Cheng (2008) finds that firms with a larger board adopt less extreme policies, suggesting that it is harder for a larger group to reach a consensus. This economic mechanism can explain why a smaller board is more associated with ZL policy. In an unreported analysis, we also find that lagged CEO and governance variables can predict firms' decisions to adopt and abandon ZL policy. For example, larger CEO ownership is associated with a significantly higher chance of adopting and lower chance of abandoning a zero-leverage status.
The governance story suggests that CEOs should find it easier to adopt a low-debt policy with a more favorable board. Therefore, the effects of the CEO ownership and tenure are likely to be stronger when the board is smaller and less independent. Table 12 reports the results of the logit analysis, in which we include the interaction terms of board and CEO characteristics. Specifically, we include the interactions of a board size dummy [where Small (Large) Board Dummy is defined as the board with It is important to emphasize that, although the economic mechanisms underlying our intuition are plausible, we cannot rule out the potential explanation that firms for which zero-leverage policy is optimal (for as yet unknown to us reasons) choose CEOs and their compensation packages correspondingly. Our results clearly indicate the need for further study of these economic mechanisms when additional data are available.
Family firms and zero-leverage firms
The private benefits of control is another well-recognized dimension of agency costs. Large shareholders and founders could care more about the private benefits of control and their voting rights. With respect to family firms, Becker (1981) and Bertrand and Schoar (2006) argue that family members can be altruistic in the sense that they can derive utility from maintaining the family legacy or the well being of other family members. Taken together, CEOs of family firms could be particularly averse to risks posed by the presence of debt.
To shed light on this issue, we use a hand-collected data set that contains family firm status for large firms over the 1992-2009 period. 26 The definition of a family firm follows that of Anderson and Reeb (2003) , Villalonga and Amit (2006) , and Li, Ryan, and Wang (2011) . Specifically, a family firm is one in which the founder or any family member of the founding family is a director, is an officer, or owns 5% or more of the outstanding equity. We also require the observations to have valid board size, board independence, and CEO tenure and compensation variables that we use in Section 4.2. Our resulting sample consists of 9,183 firm-year observations for 1,465 unique firms over 18 years. As Table 13 reports, a family firm is significantly more likely to use debt conservatively. At the same time, most of related corporate governance variables remain significant (apart from the board independence). Even after controlling for other variables, family firms are 6% more likely to pursue zero-leverage policy than nonfamily firms. Consistent with the intuition that family members care about survival, ZL firms on average survive by about 13% (10 months) longer than their proxy firms. Many recent studies investigate various aspects of family firms, such as performance (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Pé rezGonzá lez, 2006; Bennedsen, Nielsen, Pé rez-Gonzá lez, and Wolfenzon, 2007) , corporate transparency (Anderson, Duru, and Reeb, 2009) , investment (Fahlenbrach, 2009), management compensation (Gomez-Mejia, Larraza-Kintana, and Makri, 2003; Li, Ryan, and Wang, 2011) , and short sales (Anderson, Reeb, and Zhao, 2012) . Our study contributes to the literature by shedding light on the relation between family firms and the puzzling debt conservatism.
Concluding remarks
This paper presents the puzzling evidence that a substantial number of large public nonfinancial US firms follow a zero-debt or almost zero-debt policy. Using the Compustat data set, we find that, over the 1962-2006 period, on average 10.2% of such firms have zero leverage and almost 22% have a less than 5% book leverage ratio. Neither industry nor size can fully explain such puzzling behavior. Particularly surprising is the presence of a large number of zero-leverage firms that pay dividends. Zero-leverage dividend-paying firms are more profitable, pay higher taxes, and have higher cash balances than their proxies chosen by industry and size. These firms also pay substantially higher dividends than their proxies and thus the total payout ratio is relatively independent of leverage.
Were they to lever up to the level of their proxies, zeroleverage dividend-paying firms would save about 7% of the Table 12 Determinants of zero-leverage policy: interactions of chief executive officer (CEO) and governance variables.
This table reports the results of logit regressions of almost zero-leverage (AZL) policy. The dependent variable is the dummy that equals one if a firm-year has book leverage r 5%. Small (Large) Board Dummy is one if the board size is below (above) the sample median and zero otherwise. Low (High) Board Independence dummy is one if the fraction of independent directors is below (above) the sample median and zero otherwise. Control variables include Log(Size), Market to Book, Profitability, Tangibility, Dividend, Earnings Vol., R&D, Log(Age), Initial AZL Dummy, Industry Fraction of AZL, Capital Expenditure, and Asset Sale. Industry Fraction of AZL is the fraction of AZL firms (excluding the firm in question) in the same industry defined by three-digit standard industrial classification and the same year. All other variables are defined in Appendix A. All independent variables are lagged by one year. Coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) are reported. Year fixed effects for calendar years are included in all regressions. All standard errors adjust for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the firm level. Coefficients marked with nnn , nn , and n are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) market equity value in a conservative scenario. Nevertheless, zero-leverage policy is found to be persistent over the long term. Firms with large CEO ownership and more CEO-friendly boards are more likely to end up being zero-levered. Family firms are also more likely to pursue zero-leverage policies. Overall, our results suggest that the CEO and governance characteristics of firms are likely important determinants of the zero-leverage and low-leverage phenomena. Further studies of endogenous dynamic relation between financing and investment can shed more light on corporate financial policies. For example, unobserved heterogeneity in the structure of the investment process (e.g., front-loaded versus back-loaded) can influence the levels, timing, and persistence of corporate financial policy. More research that further explores these and other relations will be helpful for understanding of the zero-leverage puzzle and debt conservatism in general.
Appendix A. Definition of variables
The third column of the following table lists variable formulas, using the abbreviated names of Compustat primitive variables (in uppercase letters). This table reports the results of logit regressions of almost zero-leverage (AZL) policy. The sample includes all observations over the period 1992-2009 for which chief executive officer (CEO), governance, and family firm variables are available. The dependent variable is the dummy that equals one if book leverage in that firm-year is less than 5%. Control variables include Log(Size), Market to Book, Profitability, Tangibility, Dividend, Earnings Vol., R&D, Log(Age), Initial AZL Dummy, Industry Fraction of AZL, Capital Expenditure, and Asset Sale. Industry Fraction of AZL is the fraction of AZL firms (excluding the firm in question) in the same industry defined by three-digit standard industrial classification and the same year. All other variables are defined in Appendix A. All independent variables are lagged by one year. Coefficients, t-statistics (in parentheses), and economic significance are reported. Economic significance is the average change in probability for one standard deviation change for a continuous independent variable or for the change from zero to one for a dummy variable. Year fixed effects for calendar years are included in all regressions. All standard errors adjust for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the firm level. Coefficients marked with nnn , nn , and n are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Because L n Z L 0 ¼ D 0 =ðD 0 þ ME 0 Þ, it follows that A Z 0. There are two cases,
(1) If 0 r Ao 1, then
(2) If A 41, then
